Saturday, December 31, 2011

Free Speech, Elections, and the Left

With the Occupy Movement’s renewed commitment to “getting the money out of politics,” the idea of restricting wealthy Americans' freedom of speech appears to be gaining traction on the political left. 

Of course, most people who champion spending limits on “electioneering communications” would frame the issue quite differently. The standard premise is that money is not speech, and corporations are not people. Thus, many progressives argue, portraying the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission as a defense of civil liberties is simply a category error.

Those on the left who support repeal of Citizens United argue that the Court’s ruling implies wealthy corporations are entitled to “more speech” than the average American. And given the level of influence that money has in our political system, this strikes many progressives as an incredibly dangerous principle to adopt.

However, despite what some activists seem to believe, the notion that spending on electioneering communications represents a form of protected speech has been around for quite a long time. In fact, the Supreme Court first articulated this view decades ago in the case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Though justices in this case upheld provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act limiting individual contributions to candidates for federal office, they struck down all restrictions on independent electioneering expenditures. The logic of the Court was fairly straightforward, but it’s worth reading through the relevant passage in this ruling:

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. . . . By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. . . . While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.    

Some may argue that this decision validates the underlying point that more money implies a greater capacity for free speech, allowing the wealthy to exercise outsized influence over the political system. But if having more money gives certain individuals an unfair speech advantage, doesn’t celebrity provide the same advantage? What about rhetorical skill, personal charisma, or the sheer volume of a person’s voice? Status and ability certainly enhance a person’s capacity to disseminate ideas, but no one seems to be suggesting that we restrict famous or dynamic speakers from engaging in electioneering communications.

While more money may provide certain individuals with a greater capacity to communicate political messages, there’s no principled reason to single out this advantage over any other kind of advantage. Keep in mind that the Court deals in rule-based distinctions, not pragmatic quibbles over which form of advantage may be most dangerous.

As Eugene Volokh explained in a 2010 blog post:

People continue to characterize the Court’s campaign finance decisions as resting on the theory that money is speech. And of course money isn’t speech.

But, as I wrote a few years ago, money isn’t abortion, either. Nonetheless, a law that banned the spending of money on abortion would surely be a serious restriction on abortion rights (whether or not you think that the Court was right to recognize such rights). A law that capped the spending of money for abortions at a small amount, far smaller than abortions often cost, would likewise be a burden on abortion rights, and dismissing this argument as “it is quite wrong to equate money and abortion” would be unsound.

It goes without saying that the concept of “corporate personhood” is largely disconnected from the idea of spending as speech. But once you accept the notion that spending on independent electioneering communications is a form of protected speech, it’s easy to see why corporations should be entitled to the same liberties as other associations of people. In the same way that a group of private citizens may come together and pool money to pay for an independent political advertisement, a collection of shareholders may choose to use corporate funds—owned by each shareholder relative to her percentage of stock—to pay for an independent political advertisement. To restrict the latter and not the former is to draw an arbitrary division between business associations and other kinds of associations. Why should associations of people lose their constitutionally protected freedoms simply because of the legal structure of the organization?

The fact that most major media outlets are set up as corporate entities only reinforces this point. Are news corporations entitled to freedom of the press, but not freedom of speech? Why wouldn’t other kinds of corporations be entitled to freedom of the press? By what logic should only a single clause in the First Amendment be applied selectively to certain kinds of corporate entities?

Freedom of the press does not simply mean freedom to publish the news. Ever since Lovell V. City of Griffin (1938), the Court has held that this constitutionally protected liberty is “not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press, in its historic connotation, comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”

To add a bit of irony, it seems that the majority of Americans—particularly well-educated people—dramatically overestimate the amount of corporate money in political campaigns, in part because media outlets present a distorted picture of reality. In a sense, opponents of corporate electioneering communications seem to be heavily influenced by misleading corporate media communications.

The truth is that money doesn’t have as much of an influence over our politics as people seem to believe. While this subject is difficult to study empirically, political scientists who are familiar with the literature tend to believe that spending is a relevant but less important factor in campaign outcomes. Most campaign ads have a minimal impact on the results of an election, even when they’re coming directly from the candidate. Indeed, voter perceptions and media narratives are far more likely to influence the results of an election than any electioneering communications.

As my undergraduate political science professor once put it: “shelves of academic research suggest that individual political ads have only marginal power to swing races, which depend instead on fundamentals like people’s perception of the economy.” The same can be said of lobbying, which appears to have a little overall impact on policy changes, given the general inertia of our political system.

Instead of trying to restrict freedom of speech, perhaps a better goal of the Occupy Movement and the political left would be to focus on problems like the advantage of incumbency or the general lack of engagement and understanding throughout the electorate on basic policy issues. At this point, it’s just strange to see a movement that was founded on constitutionally protected rights to freedom of speech and association so eager to take these rights away from other Americans.

12 comments:

  1. Brief comment: "In the same way that a group of private citizens may come together and pool money to pay for an independent political advertisement, a collection of shareholders may choose to use corporate funds—owned by each shareholder relative to her percentage of stock—to pay for an independent political advertisement."

    This statement is disingenuous. Contributions are decided by executives and perhaps the board of trustees, not the shareholders. Furthermore many people own stock only indirectly, through mutual funds or pension plans and are thus even further removed from the decsions.

    To say the people who make the decisions are elected by the shareholders is equally disingenuous. Even if the shareholders had any real influence in selecting these people, other factors would strongly influence them.

    If every political contribution by a corporation were voted on by the shareholders and the owners or members of the shareholders, only then would the quoted statement be true.

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  2. Another brief comment: If, as PB says, there is nothing wrong with wealthy people effectively having more votes, we could save a lot of money & annoying phone calls by simply weighting each person's vote by his net worth.

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  3. The same can be said of almost any voluntary association. The elected leadership of the association typically makes the decisions, and the members have varying degrees of influence.

    Many union members have little or no say over the political communications sponsored and paid for by their organization. In fact, there are lots of private associations where members pay dues and have no voting rights at all. All of these associations have a First Amendment right to free speech.

    But, for the sake of argument, let's say that every shareholder did have voting rights. Would this change your view?

    As Theodore Olson, the lead counsel for Citizens United, explained during the oral arguments:

    "[T]his statute is not limited to cases where the shareholders agree or don't agree with what the corporation says. As the Court said in the Bellotti case, the prohibition would exist whether or not the shareholders agree."

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  4. In fact, the prohibition covered fully owned corporations, too. So, if I owned 100 percent of the stock in the corporation, the prohibition would have still applied.

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  5. Yes, I think I would allow associations to make political contributions if the officers were elcted, as in unions, on the basis of one man, one vote, and the purpose of the association were political. Of course, in the case of corporations, the purpose is simply to make money and the voting is weighted by number of shares.

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  6. This will be a long response, so feel free to ignore it.

    I’m not saying that there aren’t narrowly tailored ways to limit corporate electioneering communications or prevent stock funds from being used for electoral purposes without the endorsement of the individual shareholder. But it’s hard to argue that this is the issue when it comes to Citizens United. The statute restricted corporate speech across the board, irrespective of the level of knowledge or agreement among individual shareholders.

    In my view, if you want to argue that Citizens United was wrongly decided, you have to explain how the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act could possibly withstand constitutional scrutiny.

    In order to show that the legislation offered a constitutionally permissible restriction on free speech, the Justice Department had to prove that the suspect provision:

    1) Addressed a compelling state interest; and

    2) Provided the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.

    The Justice Department made three central arguments in defense of the suspect provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act:

    1) It was necessary to prevent quid-pro-quo corruption between corporations and politicians.

    2) It was necessary to protect shareholders who disagree with the position of the corporation; and

    3) It was necessary to ensure equality in the marketplace for political speech;

    Argument #1 directly contradicted the logic of Buckley. In that case, the Court drew a clear distinction between campaign contributions--which create an obvious potential for quid-pro-quo corruption--and independent, uncoordinated communications that are not connected with the campaign. In fact, Argument #1 only makes sense if we assume that Buckley does not apply to associations with a corporate structure, which leads us to Argument #2.

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  7. It’s true that many Americans own stock through mutual funds and most of these shareholders have no idea where the mutual funds are investing. The problem with Argument #2, as Justice Scalia pointed out during oral arguments, is that the overwhelming majority of corporations in the United States are small pass-through companies, not large publically traded mega-corporations.

    Here’s the relevant exchange between Justice Scalia and Elena Kagan:

    JUSTICE SCALIA: [A]s far as the interest you are now addressing, which is that those shareholders who don't agree with this political position are being somehow cheated, that doesn't apply probably to the vast majority of corporations in this country.

    GENERAL KAGAN: You are quite right, Justice Scalia, when -- we say when it comes to single shareholders, the kind of "other people's money" interests, the shareholder protection interests do not apply.

    JUSTICE SCALIA: So that can't be the justification . . . because if it were, the statute would be vastly overbroad.

    GENERAL KAGAN: There the strongest justification is the anticorruption interest.

    This is circular logic, since the anti-corruption interest would apply only if corporations were different from other kinds of associations and thus not subject to the holding in Buckley. Kagan went on to argue that the statute places no real burden on single shareholder corporations because an individual owner would be free to participate in the political process “the way that person wants to outside the corporate forum.”

    If this is true, what compelling state interest is being addressed by curtailing corporate speech across the board? And how would this statute be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest?

    Later in the oral arguments, Kagan also draws a distinction between union members and corporate stockholders because “it's a constitutional right that the unions give back essentially the funds that any union member or employee in the workplace does not want used for electoral purposes.”

    Here again, the state is conceding that Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act is not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. The statute could have forced corporations to wall off stockholder contributions unless there was express permission from the stockholder that the funding could be used for electoral purposes. (Of course, everyone knows that it doesn’t really matter, since money is fungible.)

    This entire line of reasoning is irrelevant, since Kagan ultimately argues that the state’s “anticorruption interest is as strong” in the case of unions as it is in the case of corporations. So, really, the Argument #2 is a red herring. It wouldn’t matter whether shareholders agreed with the political messages of the corporate entity; the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would still prohibit this speech, as it does with trade unions.

    The state ultimately backed off of Argument #3 because it was constitutionally indefensible. Kagan explained: “We do not rely at all on [Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce] to the extent that anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about the equalization of a speech market. So, I know that that's the way that many people understand the distortion rationale of Austin, and if that's the way the Court understands it, we do not rely at all on that.”

    In short, the state had no way to defend the suspect provision in the statue. As Theodore Olson explained in his closing statement: “[T]he government here has an overbroad statute that covers every corporation irrespective of what its stockholders think, irrespective of whether it's big, and whether it's general . . . . [A]nd it doesn't know . . . what media might be covered, what type of corporation might be covered, and what compelling justification or narrow standard would be applied to this form of speech.”

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  8. I agree that given previous decisions (Buckley & the money is speech one), it would have required a break with precedent to hold otherwise, but this court has shown no hesitation to do so in other cases (e.g. Ledbetter).

    Also we are now in a better position to see whether the effects of the decision are are bad as predicted or whether your political science teacher was correct. I think the events in Iowa today show that a candidates polling numbers (which somewhat determine his ability to get contributions and media coverage) are strongly influenced by massive ad campaigns.

    In addition, it is clear that these campaigns are now such a huge cultural and political phenomenon that they are driving the media coverage. Most of the negative info that has come to the surface was first suggested by ads or minions of the candidates, not from news reporting.

    It appears that even when a negative ad is false, if the media covers it and shows it is false, it still has a negative effect on the candidate it attacks. Coverage is more important than truth.

    For an example of the many articles that show the influence of money see http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/us/politics/campaign-ads-flood-iowa-tv-stations.html?ref=todayspaper

    Your poly sci prof may have been correct before Citizen's United, but I think we now have data that show he is wrong today.

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  9. Brendan Nyhan, a political scientist at Dartmouth, had a good post in 2008 on media narratives about misleading campaign ads:

    "While I obviously have normative concerns about misleading campaign attacks, it's much less clear that the LBJ ad had 'crushing smear power,' that the Swift Boat ads 'severely undercut' John Kerry, or that Michael Dukakis lost his 17-point lead in the polls as a result of the Willie Horton ad. The leading models of presidential elections predicted that Goldwater, Kerry, and Dukakis would lose. Journalists tend to construct post hoc narratives based on dramatic visuals from debates and campaign ads, ignoring the fundamentals that actually drive elections (the state of the economy, presidential approval, war casualties, etc.)."

    This is the prevailing view among political scientists. Negative ads may have some small impact on election outcomes, but they're far less important than people seem to believe.

    However, even negative and misleading ads actually did have a dramatic impact on elections, it's not clear that McCain-Feingold made the situation any better.

    The total amount of election-year spending actually grew in the aftermath of McCain-Feingold, which came into full effect January 2003. If you look at the level of spending relative to GDP, it was basically constant between 2000, 2004, and 2008. The amount of business contributions to candidates also grew after McCain-Feingold.

    So, campaign finance reform didn't seem have any discernible impact on the amount of money in the system. It simply redirected most of the "soft money" contributions into 527s.

    I know most people don't see it this way, but to me trying to "get the money out of politics" is sort of like trying to fighting a War on Drugs. By attempting to ban something that's considered dangerous, we're simply making the marketplace less transparent and more corrupt.

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  10. Actually I believe most European countries have publically funded elections, but I know we are exceptional. We cannot learn from others.

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  11. One last try. I'm not talking about one ad. I am talking about huge ad campaigns. If this stuff didn't work, would retail politicians, not theoretical poly sci profs, spend so much time raising money to spend in this fashion? And if advertising cannot change public opinion, then Madison Ave should be deserted.

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  12. http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/happy-lobbyists-unhappy-citizens/?ref=opinion

    Why are all these savvy folks giving so much money to pols if it doesn't do them any good?

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