On Marriage Equality and the State

To follow up on Bo’s comments, I’d like to offer some of my own thoughts on marriage as a social institution and, more specifically, the extension of federal marriage benefits to same-sex couples.

As someone who’s deeply sympathetic the idea of marriage equality, but generally skeptical of the social necessity of state-sponsored matrimony, I find myself in a bit of an intellectual quandary. Arguments in favor of same-sex marriage often rest on the assumption that marriage is a social good that needs to be subsidized by the federal government. This position—which we may call the conservative argument in favor of gay marriage—is powerfully articulated by Andrew Sullivan in his book Virtually Normal. Sullivan writes:

Marriage provides an anchor, if an arbitrary and often weak one, in the maelstrom of sex and relationships to which we are all prone. It provides a mechanism for emotional stability and economic security. We rig the law in its favor not because we disparage all forms of relationships other than the nuclear family, but because we recognize that not to promote marriage would be to ask too much of human virtue . . . . A law institutionalizing gay marriage would merely reinforce a healthy trend. Burkean conservatives should warm to the idea.

This case is pretty compelling if you accept the premise that marriage generates positive externalities not clearly associated with other kinds of social arrangements. But that viewpoint doesn’t generally square with liberal orthodoxy on nontraditional households. To suggest that marriage deserves special status is to imply that alternatives to marriage—like cohabitation—are somehow less socially desirable, even if we choose not to "disparage" them. That’s not necessarily wrong, but it’s a difficult sell to someone who believes that all social arrangements are equally valid and the state has no place in promoting one kind of lifestyle over another. For a marriage skeptic like me, Sullivan’s argument simply isn’t very convincing.

But there are other arguments in favor of same-sex matrimony that don’t require such a positive reading of marriage as a social institution. In fact, some common points offered by advocates for marriage equality actually seem to provide a persuasive narrative for eliminating state-sponsored marriage. In response to traditionalist claims about the “stabilizing” effects of heterosexual marriage, some defenders of same-sex matrimony point to statistics on the steadily increasing rates of separation and divorce among heterosexual spouses. The obvious implication is that there is nothing particularly stabilizing about an arrangement into which people can so frivolously enter and exit.

If this is true, though, what does society gain by expanding such a weak institution? There are several possible answers to this question, but I’d like to consider the one that I find most legitimate. We may call this the principled pragmatist’s argument in favor of marriage equality.

It goes something like this: Without a realistic chance of eliminating federal marriage benefits, basic equality demands that we allow gay couples access to this institution. The key difference between heterosexual couples and homosexual couples is the ability to produce children who are biologically related to both parents. This distinction may have social relevance, but with an increasing number of married couples choosing not to have children, it no longer provides sufficient grounds upon which to limit marriage benefits to heterosexual couples.

For someone who’s not convinced of the social advantages of state-sponsored matrimony, this is much more appealing than the conservative position. But accepting the principled pragmatist’s argument naturally requires us to acknowledge other kinds of arguments that may make people a bit more uncomfortable.

If equality means that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, and marriage has little to do with children who are biologically related to their parents, then why shouldn’t siblings also be allowed to marry? Genetic concerns no longer provide a compelling basis upon which to exclude sibling couples from the institution of marriage. (Even if this weren’t the case, there are important genetic concerns for other kinds of couples, but let's save this issue for another post.)

The argument that sibling couples have “alternatives” that are unavailable to gay couples also strikes me as unconvincing. Certainly, the inherent nature of homosexuality makes it different from incest in important ways. But the idea that siblings should be denied equality simply because they have other options is eerily reminiscent of claims made by anti-miscegenation advocates, who insisted that equality only necessitates a right to wed a person of the same race, rather than a person of the individual’s choosing. To suggest that siblings who love each other have “alternative” marital options is to apply similar logic: We all have an equal right to marry someone who is not an immediate family member, so we need not concern ourselves with the rights of sibling couples.

While most Americans today recognize that limiting a person’s ability to marry outside his or her race does not represent true equality, there seems to be enormous cognitive dissonance when this argument is applied to sibling relationships.

I understand that many are offended by allusions to incest in the context of a discussion over gay marriage. But I think it is incumbent upon those of us who see equality—rather than social stability—as the central issue in the debate over same-sex matrimony to give more serious consideration to other kinds of marriage equality arguments.

This is an area were reasonable people may disagree, and I admit that my thoughts here are not as developed as I’d like. For those of you who support or oppose gay marriage for different reasons—or just think my position is ridiculous—I’m curious to hear your opinions.

My goal here is to promote conversation, not to offer the final word on marriage equality.

-Jeremy